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I.
Introduction
The private nature and presumptively confidential character of
international arbitration proceedings are two of its most attractive
features. International corporations or businesses may rely on
arbitration for a "reduced likelihood of damage to ongoing
business relationships" 2 or because they do not wish to create
precedents.' In addition, parties may assume that confidential
business information, such as intellectual property rights, may be
better protected in an arbitration setting than when compared to
public court proceedings.4 However, the assumption that the
confidentiality feature of arbitration provides a broader level of
protection from disclosure than public court proceedings can no
Indeed, an
longer be supported without any qualification.'
increasing number of courts around the world seem to agree that
disclosure of documents and materials produced during
arbitrations may be compelled regardless of any express
confidentiality agreement entered into between parties.6

I See Jan Paulsson & Nigel Rawding, The Trouble with Confidentiality, II ARB.
INT'L, 303, 303 (1995); Nathan D. O'Malley & Shawn C. Conway, Document Discovery
in InternationalArbitration - Getting the Documents You Need, 18 TRANSNAT'L LAW
371, 371 (2005) (noting that international arbitration is appealing to businesses "because
of its speed, neutrality and confidentiality"). See generally Patrick Neill, Confidentiality
in Arbitration, 12 ARB. INT'L, 287, 287 (1996) (discussing the evolution of attitudes and
policies towards arbitration in the international community).
2 See, e.g., Charles S. Baldwin, Protecting Confidentiality and Proprietary
CommercialInformation in InternationalArbitration, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 451,453 (1996).
3 See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Arbitration and the Individuation Critique, 49
ARIZ. L. REV. 69, 103 (2007) (noting that, while arbitrators may not "follow or create
precedent," they may instead create "collective arbitral wisdom").
4 See Baldwin, supra note 2, at 452-53.
5 See Michael Hwang & Katie Chung, Defining the Indefinable: Practical
Problems of Confidentiality in Arbitration, 26 J. INT'L ARB. 609, 610 (2009) ("It is not
always realized that the definition of the scope of the duty of confidentiality is a major
problem."); see also Alexis C. Brown, Presumption Meets Reality: An Explorationof the
Confidentiality Obligation in International CommercialArbitration, 16 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 969, 970-76 (2001).
6 See Brown, supra note 5, at 974-75. For cases addressing this issue, see
generally Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Jan. 22, 2004, Revue de
L'Arbitrage 2004, 11, 645 (Fr.) [hereinafter Nafimco v. Foster Wheeler Trading Co.];

2012]

THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE

1061

As early as 1996, the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) noted that while "[i]t is
widely viewed that confidentiality is one of the advantageous and
helpful features of arbitration ... there is no uniform answer in
national laws as to the extent to which the participants in an
arbitration are under the duty to observe the confidentiality of
information relating to [a] case."' The UNCITRAL also stressed
that "parties that have agreed on arbitration rules or other
provisions that do not expressly address the issue of
confidentiality cannot assume that all jurisdictions would
recognize an implied commitment to confidentiality" and that the
''participants in an arbitration might not have the same
understanding as regards the extent of confidentiality that is
expected."'
Even where the parties to an arbitration agreement expressly
include a detailed confidentiality clause in their agreement,
confidentiality may no longer be fully protected.9 As a result, the
duty of confidentiality may not be viewed as absolute, but instead,
may need to be qualified in each instance. 0 More importantly,
business people and their lawyers may not simply assume that
their confidential business information may be better protected in
arbitration proceedings when compared to court proceedings. In
fact, while arbitration is a private dispute resolution process driven
by private ordering in which the parties negotiate the applicable
rules and in which the parties select the arbitrators, court
proceedings may offer a more reliable level of protection with
Emmott v. Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd., [2008] EWCA (Civ) 184, [2008]1 Lloyd's
Rep. 616 (Eng.); Glidepath BV and Others v. Thompson and Others [2005] EWHC
(Comm) 818, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 549 (Eng.); City of Moscow v. Int'l Indust. Bank EWCA
(Civ) 314, [2004] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 179 (Eng.). See also Maureen A. Weston,
Confidentiality's Constitutionality: The Incursion on Judicial Powers to Regulate Party
Conduct in Court-ConnectedMediation, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 29 (2003).
7 UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings, Annotations, U.N.
COMM'N
ON
INT'L
TRADE
LAW,
§
6,
31,
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-notes/arb-notes-e.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 26, 2012).
8 Id.

9 See, e.g., Urban Box Office Network v. Interfase Managers, No. 01 Civ. 8854,
2004 U.S. Dist. 2004 WL 2375819 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2004).
10 See Brown, supra note 5, at 989-1001 (discussing the different sources under
which the duty of confidentiality arises, from party agreement to international law).
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protective orders, settled case law, and the right to appeal.
Furthermore, as the Australian High Court noted in Esso v
Plowman," "complete confidentiality of the proceedings in an
arbitration cannot be achieved."' 2 A duty of confidentiality does
not reach witnesses in arbitration proceedings, and disclosure of
information to certain third parties may also be required by
regulatory disclosure obligations.13
It is argued in this article that by raising the burden of proof
for disclosure of information and communications produced
during arbitrations, a fair balance may be struck between the
essential private nature of arbitration proceedings and the duty of
confidentiality. In order to maintain the benefits and attractiveness
of commercial arbitrations, it is necessary to make arbitration
proceedings more predictable for those who rely on them. This
seems of particular importance in light of the fact that international
commercial arbitration is slowly losing its ability to quickly and
effectively resolve disputes as an alternative to litigation. 4 In
addition, "parties to arbitration agreements seem to increasingly
challenge arbitration awards."" By applying the U.S. workproduct doctrine as a starting point for raising the burden of proof,
the doctrine may function as a starting point for an international
consensus on how to best protect confidentiality in arbitration.
The work-product doctrine in the United States is a wellestablished principle and offers qualified protection of attorney
work product based on a balancing approach.' 6 Specifically, the
doctrine requires the weighing of the parties' interests and
determines whose interest outweighs the interests of others."
Disclosure of work product materials may be compelled by
showing (1) a substantial need for the material and (2) the inability
11 Esso Austil. Resources Ltd. v Plowman, (1995) 128 ALR 391, 391 (Austl.).
12 Id. at 400.
13 See id at 400-01.
14 See, e.g., Christoph Henkel, The Evaluation of Privacy and Confidentiality in
International Commercial Arbitrations by the English Court of Appeal in City of
Moscow v. Bankers Trust, 20 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 1, 6 (2005).
'5 Id.
16 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397-402 (1981); Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-12 (1947).
17 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Nov. 8, 1979, 622 F.2d 933, 935 (6th
Cir. 1980).
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to obtain the substantial equivalent of the information without
undue hardship."
This article briefly discusses the separate concepts of privacy
and confidentiality in international commercial arbitration. It is
argued that privacy must be understood as a procedural concept,
while confidentiality refers to the duty of non-disclosure between
arbitrating parties. The clear distinction between these concepts is
favored. The second part of this article reviews the practice of
confidentiality in international commercial arbitrations and
analyzes different approaches taken by different countries. None
of the jurisdictions this article analyzes afford confidentiality an
absolute level of protection, and courts increasingly compel
disclosure of materials and communications produced in
arbitrations. This process is done without any international
consensus, thereby becoming unpredictable and resulting in
misconceptions about confidentiality by parties relying on
arbitration. Finally, the third part of this article discusses the
work-product doctrine under U.S. law. It is suggested that the
Hickman v. Taylorl9 exceptions to the work product protection
may provide a more predictable and pragmatic alternative to the
currently inconsistent practice on confidentiality in international
commercial arbitration.
II.

Privacy, Secrecy, and the Obligation of
Confidentiality in Arbitrations
Before discussing the practice and current state of
confidentiality in international commercial arbitrations it is
necessary to clarify the difference between the procedural regime
of privacy and the duty of confidentiality as a right of nondisclosure.20 The concept of privacy in arbitration and the
obligation of confidentiality in arbitration are separate concepts.2 1
More specifically, the private nature of arbitrations may not be

See Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 397-402; Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-12.
19 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
20 See, e.g., Gu Weixia, Confidentiality Revisited: Blessing or Curse in
InternationalCommercial Arbitration?, 15 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 607, 608-09; Henkel,
supra note 14, at 2-3.
21 See Brown, supra note 5, at 972 n.6.
18
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generally assumed to guarantee or imply absolute confidentiality.2 2
While both concepts are indisputably connected and may even
overlap, the notion that they must be contemplated in tandem and
cannot be viewed independently is misplaced. English 23 and
French 24 law traditionally considered that the private nature of
arbitration proceedings implies a duty of confidentiality. At the
same time, many other jurisdictions such as Australia 25 and the
United States26 rejected this idea. More importantly, however, it
seems that even English27 and French 28 courts are increasingly
moving toward separating privacy and confidentiality more
clearly. In France, for example, the party claiming breach of the
duty of confidentiality may now have the burden of proof to
establish the existence of such duty.29 And in England, the
disclosure of documents may be necessary in the interest of justice
or for any legitimate interest of the parties participating in these
arbitrations.30
As a result, privacy only relates to each party's right to exclude
the general public from arbitration hearings and other
See id. at 974-75.
23 See, e.g., Ali Shipping Corp. v. Shipyard Trogir, [1998] 2 All E.R. 136, 146-47.
24 See, e.g., Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Jan. 17, 1999,
Revue de l'Arbitrage 2003, No. 1, 189 [hereinafter Soci6t6 True North & Societ6 FCB
International v. Bleustein et autres].
25 See, e.g., Esso Austil. Resources Ltd. v Plowman (1995) 128 ALR 391, 401
(Austl.) (The court stated it would not be "justified in concluding that confidentiality is
an essential attribute of a private arbitration imposing an obligation on each party not to
disclose the proceedings or documents and information provided in and for the purposes
of the arbitration.").
26 See United States v. Panhandle E. Corp., 118 F.R.D. 346, 349-50 (D. Del. 1998)
(stating the standard required for issuance of a protective order for arbitration documents
where one party claims they were to be kept confidential).
27 See, e.g., Emmott v. Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd. [2008] EWCA (Civ) 184, 1
Lloyd's Rep. 616 (Eng.); Glidepath BV and Others v. Thompson and Others [2005]
EWIC (Comm) 818, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 549 (Eng.); City of Moscow v. Int'l Indust. Bank
[2004] EWCA (Civ) 314, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 179 (Eng).
28 See, e.g., Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Jan. 22, 2004,
Revue de L'Arbitrage 2004, I1, 645 (Fr.).
22

29 See id

30 See, e.g., Emmott, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 184 [7]1-[77],
See also Hassneh Ins. Co. of Isr. v. Steuart J. Mew [1993]
(reasoning that disclosure may be "reasonably necessary
protection of an arbitrating party's legal rights vis-A-vis a third

1 Lloyd's Rep. at 627-28.
2 Lloyd's Rep. 243, 243
for the establishment or
party.").
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proceedings. 3' Access to hearings is limited for persons other than
the arbitrators, the parties themselves, and their representatives or
witnesses, and access always requires the explicit consent by each
party. 2 Arbitration continues to be a private process, and the
parties to an arbitration agreement control the proceedings based
on their contractual agreement.3 3 Thus, the private nature of
arbitration is a procedural concept that may be compared to the
procedural regime of court hearings "in chambers" or "in
camera." 34
Confidentiality, on the other hand, "is concerned with ...
information relating to the content of the proceedings, evidence
and documents, addresses, transcripts of the hearings or the
award."3 In contrast to privacy, the duty of confidentiality refers
to the obligation of parties in arbitration not to disclose any of the
information or materials provided for and disclosed during the
arbitration proceedings.36 The purpose of confidentiality as a right
to prevent disclosure of information is therefore more closely
linked to a legal privilege, such as the attorney-client privilege or
the work-product doctrine,37 and needs to be viewed as a separate
concept from privacy that may be waived by one party and cannot
be considered absolute.38
See Brown, supra note 5, at 972 n.6 ("Privacy means the right of the parties to
limit or prohibit the presence of 'strangers' at the proceedings.").
32 See KYRIAKI NOUSSIA, CONFIDENTIALITY IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE POSITION UNDER ENGLISH, US, GERMAN
AND FRENCH LAw 24 (2010) ("Arbitration is private but not confidential.").
33 See Brown, supra note 5, at 989 (identifying the party agreement as one source,
and in some cases the only source, of a duty of confidentiality).
34 See id at 973 ("One of the advantages of arbitration is that it is a private process
between the parties and the members of the arbitral tribunal; hearings are held in camera
and outsiders are only present to the extent that the parties agree.").
35 Expert Report of Dr. Julian D. M Lew in Esso/BHP v. Plowman, 11 ARB. INT'L
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 283, 285 (1995).
36 See id; NOUSSIA, supra note 32, at 26; see also Brown, supra note 5, at 974
("There is a general duty of confidentiality-albeit subject to limited exceptions and
qualifications-that in principle a party shall not disclose any information about the
arbitration.").
37 This article takes no sides in the discussion on whether or not the work-product
doctrine qualifies as a legal privilege or not.
38 This is not to argue that legal privilege and confidentiality are also distinct.
Specifically, parties may rely on attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine
during arbitration proceedings.
See, e.g., American Arbitration Association,
31
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The Practice of Confidentiality in International
Commercial Arbitration
The focus of this article is on the practice and protection of
confidentiality in international commercial arbitration. Arbitration
is a private dispute resolution process defined by party autonomy
and the parties' ability to define the rules according to their
needs.39 Indeed, arbitration effectively privatizes the settlement of
legal disputes.4 0 At the same time, the confidential character of
arbitration often conflicts with the public interest and with many
competing values, such as public disclosure requirements to
shareholders or insurers, or simply when one arbitrating party
wishes to challenge the arbitral awards in court.4 1 It is these
instances in which the obligation of confidentiality in commercial
arbitration is challenged and becomes questionable. Discovery of
materials disclosed during arbitration proceedings may specifically
raise concerns, such as waiver, and carry the potential of prejudice
III.

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULEs, art. 20(6) (2009) ("The tribunal shall take into
account applicable principles of legal privilege, such as those involving the
confidentiality of communications between a lawyer and a client."). However, one may
compare the duty of confidentiality in commercial arbitration and the non-disclosure
obligation related to that duty more closely to the concept of legal privilege when
compared to the procedural rule of privacy. See also Weixia, supra note 20, at 609-10
(arguing that both concepts are inherently different but overlap).
39 See Weixia, supra note 20, at 607 n. 1.
40 See S. J. Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: PrivatizingLaw Through
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 706-26 (1999).
41 See, e.g., NoUsSIA, supra note 32, at 22-23 (providing nine different examples of
such conflicts: (1) Reporting requirements where the "subject matter or the existence of a
dispute and/or its outcome must be publicly reported because it may be material to the
financial condition of a public company"; (2) disclosure as "required by shareholders,
partners, creditors or others having a legitimate business interest in the affairs of one of
the parties to the dispute"; (3) a duty for disclosure in context of other commercial
interests; (4) fiduciary duties and obligations; (5) disclosure for auditing and compliance
reasons; (6) "duties of disclosure to insurers"; (7) enforcement of the award or appeal;
(8) disclose of evidence of arbitration in another dispute; and (9) illegal or criminal
conduct uncovered during the arbitration); see also W. LAURENCE CRAIG, ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 313-14 (3d ed. 2000); Valery
Denoix de Saint Marc, Confidentiality of Arbitration and the Obligation to Disclose
Information on Listed Companies or During Due Diligence Investigations, 20 J. INT'L
ARB. 211, 211 (2003); Fourth Council Directive of 25 July 1978 Based on Article
54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the Annual Accounts of Certain Types of Companies, art. 2,
1978 O.J. (L 222) 11.
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for any of the arbitrating parties.4 2 Many international courts have
decided these questions inconsistently.4 3 The resulting lack of
uniformity may make the practice of confidentiality in commercial
arbitration increasingly unpredictable, undermining any national
preference in favor of arbitration." Some commentators have
even concluded that the practice of confidentiality in international
commercial arbitration is "chaotic."4 5 Confirming this view, this
article continues to discuss the different approaches taken in
various international jurisdictions.
A. Implied Duty of Confidentiality
English46 and French47 courts recognize the implied duty of
confidentiality. The implied duty of confidentiality does not
clearly separate the concept of privacy and confidentiality. 48
Instead, courts view the private nature of arbitration proceedings
as the essential factor ensuring the highest level of secrecy, which
in turn necessitates an implied duty of confidentiality as an
inherent requirement of all arbitration agreements, regardless of
any explicit confidentiality agreement between the parties.49
Confidentiality is thus not only considered a general necessity in
arbitration but also an implicit collateral to the concept of
privacy."o

See, e.g., Samuels v. Mitchell, 155 F.R.D. 195 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
See generallyWeixia, supra note 20, at 610-14.
44 See id. (discussing the international landscape of commercial arbitration).
45 See QUENTIN LOH SZE & EDWIN LEE PENG KHOON, CONFIDENTIALITY IN
ARBITRATION: HOW FAR DOES IT EXTEND? (2007).
46 See, e.g., Ali Shipping Corp. v. Shipyard Trogir, [1998] 2 All E.R. 136 (Eng.);
Ins. Co. v. Lloyd's Syndicate, I Lloyd's Rep. 272 (Eng.); Dolling-Baker v. Merrett, 1
W.L.R. 1205 (Eng.).
47 See, e.g., Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Sep. 17, 1999,
Revue de l'Arbitrage 2003, 189 (Fr.) [hereinafter True North & FCB Int'l v. Bleustein]
48 See Weixia, supra note 20, at 610-11.
49 See Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, le ch., 18 Feb. 1986,
Revue de l'Arbitrage 1986, Supp., 583, 585-88, note Fledeux (Fr.); see also Paulsson &
Rawding, supra note 1, at 306-07.
50 See, e.g., Oxford Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha, The Eastern Saga,
[1984] 3 All E.R. 835, 842 (Eng.) (addressing confidentiality in the context of whether to
hear two related cases concurrently).
42
43
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1. England
Dolling-Baker v. Merrett,5 ' Hassneh Insurance Co. of Israel v.
Steuart J Mew,52 and Ali Shipping v. Trogir53 remain the basis for
the practice of confidentiality in commercial arbitration in
England.54 However, more recent cases and a decision by the
Privy Council indicate a shift from a broad and unqualified
protection of confidentiality toward a more pragmatic approach on
a case-by-case basis while individually considering the
circumstances of each arbitration or request for disclosure."
In Dolling-Baker, the English Court of Appeal for the first
time clearly emphasized the importance of the private nature of
arbitration as an essential element of arbitration and determined
that, as a result, all arbitration agreements must necessarily include
an implied obligation not to disclose any documents, transcripts,
notes or evidence prepared for and used in arbitration.5 6 While the
court did not provide a precise definition, it found that the implied
obligation did not depend on the inherent confidentiality of the
material protected." The court also acknowledged that despite
any implied duty of confidentiality, disclosure of materials is
permissible if it is necessary for the fair disposal of justice."
Finally, the English Court of Appeal noted that it is the courts that
determine the precise limit of any implied obligation on a case-bycase basis.5 9
Following Dolling-Baker, the English Commerical Court
broadened the definition of the implied duty of confidentiality in
Hassneh and established some limitations.60 The Commercial
Court focused on the confidential character of arbitral awards and

51 1 W.L.R. 1205 [1990].
52 Hassneh Ins. Co. of Isr. v. Steuart J. Mew, [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 243 (Eng.).
53 Ali Shipping Corp. v. Shipyard Trogir, [1998] 2 All E.R. 136 (Eng.).
54 See Dolling-Baker, 1 W.L.R. 1205; Hassneh, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 243.; Ali Shipping
Corp., 2 All E.R. 136 (Eng.).
55 See Associated Elec. and Gas Ins. Servs. Ltd. v. European Reinsurance Co. of
Zurich [2003] 1 All E.R. 253 (Eng.).
56 See Dolling-Baker, I W.L.R. at 1213-14.
57 See id.
58 See id.
59
60

See id.
See Hassneh Ins. Co. of Isr. v. Steuart J. Mew, [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 243 (Eng.).
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noted that, in addition to documents, witness testimony, party
submissions, and pleadings, the application of an implied duty of
confidentiality may also extend to arbitral awards. 6 1 The court
further concluded that any disclosure of documents "which are
created for the purpose of that hearing would be almost equivalent
to opening the door of the arbitration room to [a] third party" and
would destroy any private character of arbitration. 62 The English
Commercial Court also broadened the legal basis for the implied
duty of confidentiality in England. The court considered the
private nature of arbitration not as the only essential factor, but
instead concluded that aspects of custom and business efficacy are
additional important factors that may also be considered.
Specifically, the court noted that there is no general bright line rule
and that limitations of confidentiality may vary depending on the
existing business relationship between parties and according to
specific circumstances in each case. 64 Finally, the Commercial
Court held that disclosure of any arbitral award is appropriate
without party consent if disclosure is reasonably necessary for the
protection of the party's rights or if disclosure is in the interest of
justice.6 5
In Ali Shipping Corp. v. Shipyard Trogir," the English Court
of Appeal responded to the English Commercial Court's ruling in
Hassneh6 ' and reaffirmed and extended its earlier ruling in Dolling
Baker.6 ' The Court of Appeal held that an implied obligation of
confidentiality attaches as a matter of law and may not be based

See id. at 247.
62 See id
63 See id. at 246.
64 See id (citing Tournier v. Nat'l Provincial and Union Bank of Eng., [1924] 1
K.B. 461, 486 (Eng.)).
65 Hassneh, 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 249 (holding that disclosure of an arbitral award or
its reasons is only allowed if sufficiently necessary to protect a party's rights against a
third party); see also Ins. Co. v. Lloyd's Syndicate, [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep 272 (Eng.)
(narrowing the confidentiality standard as put forward in Hassneh). The fact that an
award is simply persuasive or may assist a party in litigation vis-A-vis a third party is not
sufficient to justify disclosure. Ins. Co. v. Lloyd's Rep., at 275-76.
66 [1998] 2 All E.R. 136 (Eng.).
67 [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 243 (Eng).
68 [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1205 (Eng.).
61
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merely on custom or business efficiency.6 9 More importantly, the
court stressed the importance of the essentially private nature of
arbitration proceedings and held that the corollary of privacy
propounds a general obligation of confidentiality implicit to any
contractual agreement to arbitrate.o While acknowledging the
difficulty in establishing the boundaries of this implied obligation,
the Court of Appeal suggested that the definition of a broad set of
exceptions might best solve this dilemma." The court particularly
seemed to favor this approach over any renewed review and
interpretation of the implied duty of confidentiality on a case-bycase basis and in order to prevent any further erosion of its
holding.72 The court recognized five exceptions: (1) Party consent,
(2) order of court, (3) leave of court, (4) protection of an
arbitrating party's legitimate interest, and (5) where disclosure is
requisite to the public interest.73 In addition, the Court of Appeal
noted that no exception of the duty of confidentiality should go
beyond the standard of reasonable necessity. 74
While Ali Shipping" remains the leading precedent on
establishing the implied duty of confidentiality in arbitration as a
matter of law, the English Court of Appeal more recently seemed
to soften its stance on a broad view of exceptions in favor of a
more pragmatic case-by-case approach." The two cases most
noteworthy in this context are Department ofEconomic Policy and
Development of the City of Moscow and Another v. Bankers Trust
Co. and Another," and Emmott v. Michael Wilson & Partners
Ltd.78
69
70

See Ali Shipping Corp. v. Shipyard Trogir, [1998] 2 All E.R. 136, 146-47.
See id

71 See id at 147.

See id. at 146-47.
73 See id at 147-48.
74 See Ali Shipping Corp., [1998] 2 All E.R. 150-52.
75 See id.
76 See, e.g., Henkel, supra note 14, at 5-6 ("While not explicitly explaining the
noted relevancy, the court seems to suggest that ... courts need to exercise discretion on
a case-by-case basis in determining the question of publicity.").
77 [2004]
EWCA
(Civ)
314,
4
All
E.R.
746,
available at
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2004/314.html.
78 [2008]
EWCA
(Civ)
184,
available
at
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2008/184.html.
72
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The issue on appeal in City of Moscow involved a challenge to
the validity of an arbitration award and, in particular, the question
of whether the judgment dismissing this challenge should be
available for publication.7 ' The dispute involved a commercial
loan and the alleged default on loan payments by the City of
Moscow. Moscow succeeded in the arbitration over Bankers
Trust, which in turn challenged the validity of the arbitral award
before the English Commercial Court.so The Commercial Court
dismissed Bankers Trust's application but failed to mark its
judgment as private or confidential."' As a result of this failure, a
legal research website obtained a copy of the judgment and made
it available to its subscribers.82 Upon objection by Bankers Trust,
the Commercial Court, in a separate judgment, ordered that the
original judgment should remain private and not be available for
publication."
It is against this second judgment of the
Commercial Court that Moscow appealed to the English Court of
Appeal. The City of Moscow asserted that the original or first
judgment of the Commercial Court should be made available for
general publication.84
In its decision, the English Court of Appeal rejected the notion
of a generalized duty of confidentiality." In so doing, the court
developed the theory of a spectrum in which the factors for
publicity must be balanced against the need for preserving privacy
and confidentiality in arbitrations."
The court distinguished
between considerations of publicity at the level of court hearings
and those governing the publications of court judgments." It
recognized that as a starting point court hearings may be
79 For a more detailed discussion of the decision of the English Court of Appeal in
City of Moscow, see Henkel, supra note 14.
80 See City ofMoscow, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 314 [4]-[6].
81 See id [5].
82 See id
83 See id.

84 See id. [4].
85 [2004] EWCA (Civ) 314 [24].
86 See id. [40] ("There is . .. a spectrum in relation to the nature of the proceedings.
Plainly not all the arbitration claims referred to in CPR Rule 62.10(3)(b) need to be
treated as confidential. And those that do will vary in the extent to which they should be
so treated and the method by which to do so.") (Morritt V-C, A., concurring) Id. [56].
87 [2004] EWCA (Civ) 314 [24].
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conducted in private but rejected the view that this automatically
equates to a blanket presumption in favor of privacy." The court
held that "[t]he consideration that parties have elected to arbitrate
confidentially and privately cannot dictate the position in respect
of arbitration claims brought to court." 9 In contrast to arbitration
agreements, court proceedings are not consensual.9 0 Following
this rationale, the court consequently also rejected the perception
that confidentiality in arbitrations is the dominant factor in
determining whether or not a duty of confidentiality extends to
court proceedings. 91
In Emmott v. Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd,92 arbitration
proceedings were commenced in England; at the same time, court
proceedings were also initiated in the British Virgin Islands and
During the arbitration
New South Wales in Australia.93
proceedings in England, the claimant, Michael Wilson & Partners,
withdrew allegations of fraud and conspiracy but continued to
pursue them in the court proceedings in the British Virgin Islands
and New South Wales against Emmott and additional defendants. 94
Emmott sought disclosure of documents disclosed during the
arbitration proceedings in England to prove that Michael Wilson
& Partners tried to mislead the courts in the British Virgin Islands
and Australia. 95 The English Court of Appeal concluded that the
documents sought for disclosure were in principle confidential, but
subject to two exceptions.9 6 First, disclosure may be allowed if the
documents are reasonably necessary for the protection of
Emmott's legitimate interest, such as defending against a claim
brought in court by a third party.97 Second, the court held that
disclosure may be appropriate if the duty of confidentiality and the

88 See id. [34], [42].
89 See id. [34].
90 See id.

91 See id. [10].
See Emmott v. Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 184
availableathttp://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2008/184.html.
93 See id [4].
94 See id. [10], [14].
95 See id. [45].
96 See id [27].
97 Emmott, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 184.
92
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obligation of non-disclosure is only utilized to potentially mislead
foreign courts." While the court applied Ali Shipping in this case
and embraced the fact the duty of confidentiality is a substantive
rule of arbitration law, the court also recognized that Emmott was
an unusual case that required a case-specific analysis and thus did
not necessarily fit well in the broader set of exceptions.9 9 The
court also broadened the exception of disclosure in the public
0 o The
interest or the interest of justice as defined in Ali Shipping.'
disclosure of documents produced in arbitration in the interest of
justice is not limited to the interest of justice in England and may
include foreign jurisdictions.
Despite some of these more recent decisions in England, the
clearest criticism of a broad duty of confidentiality implied under
English law came from a decision of the Privy Council'' in
Associated Electric and Gas Insurance Services Ltd. v. European
Reinsurance Co. of Zurich (Aegis).'02 Due to the fact that the
parties in Aegis had explicitly entered into a rather detailed
confidentiality agreement, the decision indicates that even if
parties clearly intend non-disclosure they may no longer rely on an
unqualified protection of confidentiality in England.
Aegis involved the use of arbitration materials obtained in a
first arbitration to be utilized to support a plea of issue estoppel in

98 See id. [28].
99 See Steven Friel, Emmott v. Wilson and PartnersLtd - Confidentiality, 11(3)
INT'L ARB. L. REV. 46.
100 See infra Part III.A.1 ("The Court recognized five exceptions: (1) Party consent,
(2) order of court, (3) leave of court, (4) to protect an arbitrating party's legitimate
interest, and (5) where disclosure is requisite to the public interest.").
101 The Privy Council is a body of advisors to the government of the United
Kingdom, and is one of the oldest governmental bodies in the United Kingdom, though it
has evolved with the overall structure of the government and today reflects the fact that
the United Kingdom is a constitutional monarchy. See Privy Council Overview, PRIVY
COUNCIL OFFICE, http://privycouncil.independent.gov.uk/privy-council (last visited Mar.
22, 2012). The Privy Council advises institutions that are incorporated by Royal Charter,
plays a role in certain statutory regulatory bodies, and through its Judicial Committee is a
final Court of the Appeal for the United Kingdom's overseas territories and
Commonwealth countries. The Judicial Committee consists of both the Supreme Court
Justices and some Commonwealth judges. See id.
102 Associated Elec. and Gas Ins. Services Ltd. v. European Reinsurance Co. of
Zurich,
[2003]
1
All
E.R.
253,
available
at
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKPC/2003/11.html [hereinafter Aegis]
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a second arbitration.'o3 Although the decision shared many
similarities with the facts in Ali Shipping, unlike the parties in Ali
Shipping, the parties in Aegis had entered into an express
confidentiality agreement.104 As a result, Ali Shipping was not
directly applicable to Aegis, but the Privy Council referred to the
holding in Ali Shipping and commented on the ruling in dicta.'0o
The Privy Council acknowledged that the confidentiality
agreement between the parties was intended to be exhaustive; and
that the agreement seemed to clearly prohibit any communication
or disclosure of documents from the first arbitration.o' The
Council clarified, however, that although the contractual
agreement may provide a strong argument in favor of an absolute
duty of confidentiality, it is not the only basis for the evaluation of
that. duty. 0 7 In particular, the extent of the confidentiality
agreement must be assessed with regard to the surrounding
circumstances in which it was made and the basic principles and
purpose of arbitration.' Due to the business relationship between
the parties and the fact that the arbitration included commercially
sensitive materials, the Council determined that the relevant
circumstances in the present case justified the use of a
confidentiality agreement.10 While the Privy Council identified
private dispute resolution as the essential purpose of arbitration, it
noted that the enforcement of the arbitral award remains within the
domain of the courts. "o The Privy Council referenced various
common law and statutory remedies and emphasized the
possibility to sue for failure to honor an award in form of a claim
for debt, damages, or specific performance."' Moreover, the
Council acknowledged that a party may rely on an award as
having conferred a right or determined a fact." 2 The latter

See id. [I].
104 Ali Shipping Corp. v. Shipyard Trogir, [1998] 2 All E.R. 136.
105 Aegis, [2003] 1 All E.R. 253 [19].
103

106 See id. [7].
107 See id.
108 See id
109 See id [8].

110 Aegis, [2003] 1 All E.R. 253 [9].
Ill See id.

112 See id. [9], [20].
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conclusion is noteworthy as the Council further clarifies that the
duty to perform or honor an award also includes the recognition
and respect of the rights which it declares. Any interference with
this right constitutes non-performance and establishes a cause of
action."
The Privy Council thus recognized that confidentiality even
under an exhaustive confidentiality agreement is only protected if
disclosures of the award or parts thereof "raise the mischief
against which the confidentiality agreement is directed." 1 4 In
other words, confidentiality is only protected if any publication of
arbitration materials amounts to a violation or substantial prejudice
as envisioned by the confidentiality agreement between the
parties.
As previously indicated, the Privy Council referred to Ali
Shipping only at the end of its judgment and in comments made in
dicta."' In these comments, the Privy Council criticized the
characterization of the duty of confidentiality as an implied term
inherent to arbitration agreements. It noted that an implied duty of
confidentiality "elides privacy and confidentiality" in that it fails
to distinguish between different kinds of confidentiality, which
may attach to different types of documents or documents that were
obtained in different ways." 6 The Privy Council also observed
that the English Court of Appeal in Ali Shipping did not
sufficiently consider the existing differences between materials
obtained during arbitration proceedings and the arbitration
award,"' the latter of which may automatically be subject to
disclosure when used for accounting purpose or purposes of
The Privy Council thus concluded that
enforcement."'
"[g]eneralizations and the formulation of detailed implied terms
are not appropriate."II19

113 See id. [10].

See id. [8].
I15 [2003] 1 All E.R. 253 [19].
116 See id. [20].
117 See id.
114

118 See id.
119

See id.
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2. France
French courts also recognize the existence of an implied duty
of confidentiality as an essential part of any agreement to
arbitrate.120 In contrast to English law, however, the protection of
confidentiality under French law seems somewhat broader.
21
French
Unlike the English Court of Appeal in Ali Shipping,1
courts generally do not permit any exceptions to confidentiality
and non-disclosure. 12 2 In fact, the French Court of Appeal seems
to opine that public disclosure requirements may not conflict, but
with the strict enforcement of confidentiality in
rather co-exist
3

arbitrations.

12

While France is a civil law jurisdiction, 124 French statutes do
not provide any explicit provision defining the duty of
confidentiality in arbitrations. 125 The practice and recognition of
an implied duty of confidentiality in France is thus primarily based
on various court rulings and custom. 126
In Aita v. Ojjeh, 127 the Paris Court of Appeal was petitioned to
annul an arbitration award issued in England.128 Petitioner Aita

120 See, e.g., Nafimco v. Foster Wheeler Trading Co. AG, Cour d'appel [CA]
[regional court of appeal] Paris, le ch., Jan. 22, 2004, Revue de I' Arbitrage 2004 3, 647
(Fr.); Tribunal de commerce de Paris [Court of Commerce] Paris, True North & FCB
Int'l v. Bleustein et autres, (Sept. 17, 1999), Revue de l'Arbitrage 2003, 189 (Fr.); Cour
d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, le ch., 18 Feb. 1986, Revue de l'Arbitrage
1986, Supp., 583 (Fr.).
121 Ali Shipping Corp., [1998] 2 All E.R. 136.
122 See Brown, supra note 5, at 975-76.
123 See, e.g., True North & FCB Int'l v. Bleustein et autres, (Sep. 17, 1999), Revue
de l'Arbitrage 2003, 189 (Fr.).
124 See, e.g., CODE CIVIL [C. CIv.] art. 2059 et seq. (Fr.); NOUVEAU, CODE DE
PROCEDURE CIVILE [N.C.P.C.] art. 1442 (Fr.).
125 See, e.g., True North & FCB Int'l v. Bleustein et autres, (Sep. 17, 1999), 2003
Revue de l'Arbitrage 2003, 189. See also CODE CIVIL [C. CIv.] arts. 2059-61 (Fr.)
(governing the use of arbitration agreements).
126 See, e.g., Nafimco v. Foster Wheeler Trading Company, AG, Cour d'appel [CA]
[regional court of appeal], Paris, le ch., Jan. 22, 2004, Revue de 1' Arbitrage 2004 3,
647; True North & FCB Int'l v. Bleustein et autres, (Sep. 17, 1999), 2003 Revue de l'
Arbitrage 2003, 189 (Fr.); Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, le ch., 18
Feb. 1986, Revue de l'Arbitrage 1986, Supp., 583 (Fr.).
127 Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, le ch., 18 Feb. 1986, Revue
de l'Arbitrage 1986, Supp., 583 (Fr.).
128 See id at 584.

2012]

THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE

1077

argued that the parties did not enter into a valid arbitration
agreement, that the arbitration essentially violated his right to a
fair trial, and that the award issued in England violated French
public policy.129 The Court of Appeal rejected all of these claims,
arguing that the annulment proceedings instead violated the duty
of confidentiality.130 The court held that the sole purpose of the
annulment proceeding was an attempt to disclose confidential
information from the arbitration. It further noted that the
annulment, as a result, would also violate the very nature of
arbitration proceedings as a private dispute settlement procedure
chosen by the parties to maintain confidentiality and prevent
publication.'3 '
Socidtd True North et Socidtd FCB Internationalv. Bleustein et
32
al' addressed the issue of confidentiality in a different context.
After the commencement of an arbitration, one party disclosed
information about the proceeding without the other party's
consent.'33 Arguing breach of the duty of confidentiality, the other
party withdrew from the arbitration.13 The French court agreed
and held that without a specific legal obligation to disclose
information, the disclosure of such information violates the duty of
confidentiality under the arbitration agreement. 135
However, even among French courts, the attitude towards an
unqualified protection of confidentiality in arbitration seems to
change. The more recent case of Nafimco v. Foster Wheeler
Trading Company AG'3 serves as an example. The Court of
Appeal increased the burden of proof, holding that any party
claiming breach of confidentiality not only has the burden of
proving that a duty of confidentiality actually existed, but also that
the duty was neither waived nor objected to by the other party.'3 7

129 See id
130 See id
131 See id.

See, e.g., True North & FCB Int'l v.Bleaustein, (Sep. 17, 1999), 2003 Revue de
I'Arbitrage 2004, 189.
133 See id. at 191-92.
134 See id
135 See id.
136 Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Jan. 22, 2004.
137 See id.
132
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This, of course, essentially amounts to a rejection of an implied
duty of confidentiality. While custom and business efficacy as
well as the parties' prior business relationship may be factors to be
considered in this context, without an express confidentiality
agreement, the burden of proving the existence of such an implied
duty will most certainly require a very high standard of evidence.
B. Express Duty of Confidentiality
Courts in Australia,' Sweden,'3 9 and the United States 40 do
not recognize a duty of confidentiality inherent to arbitration
agreements, unless the parties explicitly agreed to such a duty and
contracted for it. Whilst acknowledging the private character of
arbitration hearings, these jurisdictions reject the notion that
confidentiality is a necessary prerequisite of the private nature of
arbitration in general, and clearly distinguish the concept of
privacy and confidentiality.141
1. Australia
The High Court of Australia is considered the most adamant
proponent of an express duty of confidentiality in international
commercial arbitration.142 In its 1995 decision Esso v. Plowman,
the High Court provided the clearest distinction between privacy
and confidentiality to date.' 4 3
The Minister for Manufacturing and Industry Development
brought an action against two producers of natural gas-Esso and
BHP Petroleum-and two utility companies. The Minister sought
declarations concerning whether information disclosed by Esso
and BHP in the course of their respective arbitrations with the two
utilities was subject to an obligation of confidence.144 Underlying
this action were issues concerning third party access to documents

138 See supra note 142.
139 See infra note 155.
140 See infra note 172.
141 See infra Parts III.B.1, 111.B.2, 1II.B.3.
142 See Pieter Sanders, Book Review: Quo Vadis Arbitration? Sixty Years of
Arbitration Practice,95 AM. J. INT'L L. 728, 729 (2001).
143 See Esso Ausil. Resources Ltd. v Plowman, (1995) 128 ALR 391 (Austl.).
144 See id. at 391.
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in connection with price settings and related antitrust concerns.14 5
While the Australian High Court emphasized the importance
of privacy in arbitration as an essential reason for its attractiveness
and efficiency, it clarified that confidentiality is only a
The
"consequential benefit . .. attach[ed] to arbitrations."l4 6
Australian High Court reasoned that absent an express contractual
provision, the private character of arbitration hearings alone does
not justify the conclusion that confidentiality is an essential
attribute of a private arbitration.'4 7 The court also noted that
complete confidentiality of arbitration proceedings is simply
impossible in today's business environment.'48 For example, the
obligation of confidentiality does not attach to witnesses. Those
witnesses are then at liberty to disclose information to third
parties. Moreover, arbitration awards may become subject to
court review and arbitrating parties may be entitled to disclose
information to insurance carriers and shareholders.14 9 Among
others, it seems that one of the rationales of the Australian High
Court is based on the conclusion that absolute confidentiality in
arbitrations is unachievable and that arbitration agreements simply
cannot imply or guarantee that at least some information of the
arbitration will not be disclosed to the public.
2. Sweden
The Swedish Supreme Court in BulgarianForeign Trade Bank
Ltd. v. A. I. Trade Finance Inc (hereinafterBulbank)so essentially
followed the Australian High Court's reasoning in Esso, with
145

See id.

146 See id. at 401.
147

See id; see also Alliance Petroleum Aust. NL v. Australian Gas Light Co.,

(1983) 34 SASR 215, 229-32.
148

Esso Austl. Resources Ltd. v Plowman, (1995) 128 ALR 391, 400 (Austl.).

I49 Id.
150 See, e.g., A. 1. Trade Fin. Inc v. Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank Ltd., T1092-98,

Hovratt [Hovr] [Court of Appeals] 1999 ref. T1092-98 (Swed.); Tatsuya Nakamura,
Confidentiality In Arbitration SVEA Court of Appeal Decision - Is it Good News From
Stockholm, 14-6 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 24 (1999); Constantine Partasides, Bad
News From Stockholm: Bulbank And Confidentiality AD ABSURDUM, 13-12 MEALEY'S
INT'L ARB. REP. 15 (1998); Constantine Partasides, Bulbank - The Final Act, 15-12
MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 12 (2000); Felix Weinacht, Party Succession In Agreements
To Arbitrate, Sweden Backs Down Over Paractical Considerations, 14-9 MEALEY'S
IN'TL. ARB. REP. 16 (1999).
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some distinctions.1 "' At issue in Bulbank was whether the
publication of an arbitral award initiated by one of the parties
constituted a breach of contract, which in turn would invalidate the
arbitration agreement and the award that was issued.152 The
arbitration agreement did not include an express confidentiality
agreement. 15 3 Furthermore, Swedish arbitration law did not
address the issue of confidentiality.154
As with the Australian High Court, the Swedish Supreme
Court rejected the argument that the private nature of arbitration
automatically gives rise to a general duty of confidentiality.'55 The
Swedish Court focused on the contractual agreement between the
parties and concluded that "a general starting point for assessing
the issue of the duty of confidentiality is that the arbitration
proceedings are based on a contract."' 5 6 The court noted that
parties' interests alone do not amount to a legal obligation to
observe confidentiality on pain of sanctions. 5 1 It is also the
prevailing view among attorneys and arbitrators that a duty of
confidentiality does not apply without a separate and explicit
agreement by the parties.5 s According to the court, the advantage
of privacy
does not mean that it is a precondition that a duty of
confidentiality prevails for the parties. The real meaning of this,
compared with judicial proceedings, is instead . .. that the
proceeding are not public, i.e., that the public does not have any

Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank Ltd. v. A. I. Trade Fin. Inc., NYH Juridiskt Arkiv
[NJA] [Supreme Court] 2000 ref. T1881-99 (Swed.).
152 See id.at B-1.
153 See id.at B-2.
154 See id. ("It is undisputed between the parties that the arbitration agreement does
not govern [the issue of confidentiality] explicitly. Nor are there any provisions
concerning a duty of confidentiality in the applicable Arbitration Act of 1929. It may be
added that the issue is not governed by the new Arbitration Act, which now has replaced
the 1929 Act.").
155 See id. at B-2, B-3.
156 Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank Ltd. v. A. I. Trade Fin. Inc., NYH Juridiskt Arkiv
[NJA] [Supreme Court] 2000 ref. T1881-99 (Swed.).
157 Id. at B-3.
158 Id. at B-3.
151

1081

THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE

2012]

right of insight by being in attendance at the hearing. ...

159

In a further similarity to the Australian High Court, the
Swedish Supreme Court also recognized that confidentiality in
arbitration may never be observed in absolute terms, as parties
may be obliged to inform third parties about pending arbitration or
challenge an award in court without impediment.'60 The court also
noted that the information dealt with in arbitration often differs to
a great extent and that, as a result, any disclosure by arbitrating
parties may require different considerations without any general
assumptions and depending on the nature of the information in
question. 161
In that, the Swedish Supreme Court seems to
underscore that there cannot be any bright-line rule in determining
confidentiality, but instead that any finding of a duty of
confidentiality must be made on a case-by-case basis.
3. United States
In the United States, the case law on the issue of
confidentiality in arbitrations is inconsistent and unclear. Only a
few published court decisions directly address the issue of privacy
and confidentiality in commercial arbitration.162 Instead, when
considering the issue of confidentiality, most U.S. cases deal with
health or employment law.163 For example, in Rosenberger v.
Merrill Lynch, 164 a federal district court had to consider an Age
Discrimination in Employment Act claim. The court determined
that, although arbitration is a system that traditionally makes
decisions in private and "is dedicated to the resolution of

159
160
161

Id
Id.

Id
See, e.g., Samuels v. Mitchell, 155 F.R.D. 195 (N.D. Cal. 1994); United States v.
Panhandle E. Corp., 118 F.R.D. 346 (D. Del. 1998); Giacobazzi Grandi Vini Spa v.
Renfield Corp., No. 85 Civ. 6434, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1793 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 10,
1987); Industrotech Constructors, Inc. v. Duke Univ., 314 S.E.2d 272 (1984).
163 See, e.g., Charles S. Baldwin, Protecting Confidentiality and Proprietary
Commercial Information in InternationalArbitration, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 451 (1996);
Derek Lisk, ConfidentialityofArbitrations,63 TEX. Bus.L.J. 234, 237 (2000).
164 Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190 (D.
Mass. 1998).
162
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individual, private disputes," 65 this does not articulate a "public
norm."' 66
Other U.S. courts have compared arbitration proceedings with
litigation and concluded that the attorney-client privilege and the
work-product doctrine are applicable.16 7 In Milone v. General
Motors Corp.,6 the court reversed a lower court's holding that
files in an arbitration were protected by the work-product doctrine
and could not be disclosed during court proceedings.' 6 ' As part of
a products liability action arising from a car accident, General
Motors sought production of the plaintiffs insurer's claim file,
including transcripts of testimony given by the plaintiff in an
arbitration hearing involving the same accident.'
The court
the
file
was
protected
court's
decision
that
reversed the lower
7
under the work-product doctrine. ' The court reasoned that the
insurer did not prepare the materials for the file in connection with
the plaintiffs liability for damages, the insurer's duty under the
policy, or the defense of claims against the plaintiff.172 Instead, the
court ruled the material from the arbitration was relevant and
material in the court proceedings and ordered disclosure. 173
In Samuels v. Mitchell,174 the defendants contended that the
arbitration documents were protected by both the attorney-client
privilege and the work-product doctrine."' The court reasoned
that, because the defendant made the documents available to her
accountant but not to her attorneys, the attorney-client privilege
did not protect the documents.'7 6 With regard to the work-product
doctrine, the court reasoned that, because of the adversarial nature

165
166
167

No. 87
168
169
170

171
172

173

174
175
176

Id. at 198.
Id
See, e.g., Samuels, 155 F.R.D. at 199-201; Int'l Ins. Co. v. Peabody Int'l Corp.,
C 464, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5109 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
Milone v. Gen. Motors Corp., 84 A.D.2d 921, 921 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
Id at 922.
Id. at 921.
Id. at 922.
Id. at 921.
Milone v. Gen. Motors Corp., 84 A.D.2d 921, 921 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
155 F.R.D. 195, 197 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
Id. at 197.
Id at 199.
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of arbitration, documents prepared for arbitration should be
The court also
protected by the work-product doctrine.'7 7
examined whether the disclosure of arbitration documents to the
It
accountant acted as a waiver of the work product privilege.'
concluded that the waiver is only effective if the disclosure to a
third party "substantially increases the opportunity for potential
adversaries to obtain the information," which it denied in the

current case.179
In Industrotech Constructors, Inc. v. Duke University, the
The defendant
court also addressed the issue of waiver.'"
appealed from an order directing it to produce arbitration
proceeding transcripts between the defendant contractor and
another contractor,'"' arguing that the parties had stipulated to
keep the arbitration record confidential.' 82 However, the defendant
produced no evidence of such a stipulation."' The defendant
further argued that, even without the stipulated confidentiality,
public policy should require that the arbitration remain
confidential.'8 4 In dismissing these contentions, the court noted
that neither the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules, under
which the arbitration occurred, nor the state's statutes required
"strict confidentiality."'
Further, the court noted that the
defendant itself had already disclosed the transcripts to a nonparty, thus waiving any privilege it may have claimed.'
Lastly,
the court dismissed the defendant's argument that the transcripts
were "prepared in anticipation of litigation."' The court reasoned
that the record contained no indication of what litigation may have
been anticipated when the transcripts were prepared; in fact, the
177 Id. at 200.

Id
179 Samuels v. Mitchell, 155 F.R.D. 195, 197 (N.D. Cal. 1994)(quoting In re Grand
Jury, 561 F. Supp. 1247, 1257 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)).
180 Industrotech Constructors, Inc. v. Duke Univ., 314 S.E. 2d 272, 272 (N.C. App.
1989).
178

181 Id. at 273-74.
182 Id at 274.

Id
Id
185 Industrotech Constructors,Inc., 314 S.E. 2d at 274.
186 Id
183
184

187 Id. at 275.
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court noted that "the law favors arbitration as a means of avoiding
Thus, the court affirmed the order directing the
litigation."'
production of the transcripts, but noted that the defendant had the
right to excise portions that were work product.'"
More recently, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York in Urban Box Office Network, Inc. v. Interfase
Managers,L.P. went even further and held that waiver of privilege
may even render any confidentially agreement "irrelevant." 9 0 The
defendants asserted that, even if they had waived their attorneyclient privilege, disclosure of any documents from arbitration was
still prohibited under the parties' confidentiality agreement.' 9 ' The
court disagreed and held that the defendants had waived their
privilege with the simultaneous effect of making the
The court did
confidentiality agreement "irrelevant." 92
acknowledge, however, that the confidentially agreement entered
into between the parties may have applied, if waiver of privilege
would not have applied and the defendants could have provided
evidence of invoking the agreement, such as by at least marking
the documents as confidential.' 93
The two leading cases on confidentiality in the United States
are United States v. Panhandle Eastern Corp.'9 4 and Contship
Containerlines, LTD v. PPG Industries, Inc."' Both decisions
involved international arbitrations and reject the view that the lack
of any express agreement between the parties somehow implies a
duty of confidentiality in arbitration agreements.' 96 In Panhandle,
the United States brought action against Panhandle Eastern
Corporation to protect a security interest.'9 7 Claiming
confidentiality and prejudice, the defendant attempted to prevent
188
189

Id.
Id.

190 Urban Box Office Network, Inc. v. Interfase Managers, L.P., No. 01 Civ. 8854,
2004 WL 2375819, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
19I Id. at *1.
192 Id. at *5.
'93 Id
194 United States v. Panhandle E. Corp., 118 F.R.D. 346 (D. Del. 1988).
195 Contship Containerlines, Ltd. v. PPG Indus., Inc., No. 00 Civ. 0194 RCCHBP,
2003 WL 1948807 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2003).
196 Id.; Panhandle, 118 F.R.D. at 351.
197 See Panhandle, 118 F.R.D. at 350.
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disclosure of documents relating to an arbitration conducted in
Geneva, Switzerland, under the rules of the International Chamber
of Commerce (ICC).'98 The Federal District Court of Delaware
rejected that view and dismissed the defendant's contention that
the parties had a "general understanding ... that the pleadings and
related documents in the [a]rbitration would be kept
confidential."' 99 The court particularly criticized that the parties
failed to enter into an "actual agreement of confidentiality,
documented or otherwise."2 00 It also rejected the defendant's view
that the "confidential character"20 1 of the arbitration procedure
must be respected by everyone who participates in that work in
whatever capacity.22

Instead, the court reasoned that the rules

governing the internal functioning of the arbitration proceeding are
not binding on the court.2 03 The court in Panhandle therefore
failed to recognize any general or implied duty of confidentiality
in international arbitrations and further underlined the need of an
express confidentiality agreement in arbitrations.
The U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York came to a
similar conclusion in Contship Containerlines, LTD v. PPG
Industries, Inc.2 04 In this case, the defendants refused to provide
discovery of materials they provided in arbitration and asserted
that the documents were protected by both the English Law, which
implied confidentiality in arbitration, and the work-product
doctrine.20 5
The court noted that due to the lack of any
confidentially agreement, and regardless of any implied duty,
discovery could be compelled if: "(1) [T]he documents are
relevant and (2) 'disclosure is necessary for disposing fairly of the
cause or matter or for saving costs."' 20 6 The court also briefly
Id.
199 Id
200 Id
201 Id. The defendant claimed that "the applicable Rules of the Court of Arbitration
of the International Chamber of Commerce ('ICC Rues') require the . . . [a]rbitration
documents to be kept confidential." Id. at 349.
202 Panhandle, 118 F.R.D. at 350.
203 Id
204 Contship Containerlines Ltd. v. PPG Indus., Inc., No. 00 Civ. 0194 RCCHBP,
2003 WL 1948807 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2003).
198

205 Id at*1.

206 Id at *2; see also Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int'l, Inc., 59
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discussed work product, but determined that the work-product
doctrine was waived because the documents were disclosed to
both parties during arbitration.20 7
C. Statutory Protection of Confidentiality
In addition to precedent, the approach taken in some
jurisdictions is that of statutory regulation. The article discusses
three different examples.2 08 New Zealand is chosen due to the fact
Fed.R.Serv.3d 473 (Dist. Ct. D.Colo. Aug. 13, 2004). In this case, the plaintiff sought
document production of material from a pending arbitration. Id. at 1. The court found
that the parties had made an express "agreement" that all documents in the arbitration
would be "treat[ed] as confidential," and the arbitrator agreed. Id. The court, however,
acknowledged that it has the authority to modify protective orders and confidentiality
agreements if to do so "avoid[s] duplicative discovery in collateral litigation [and] policy
considerations favoring the efficient resolution of disputes." Id. at 2. The defendant
argued that the court should uphold confidentiality because the plaintiff did not prove a
"compelling need" for those documents, and they would reveal confidential business
information. Id. at 3. The court denied defendant's motion to quash the document
production subpoena, but decided to stay compliance with the subpoena until the
arbitrator determined if document production would violate the confidentiality
agreement. Id For a different outcome, see ITT Educational Services, Inc. v. Arce, 533
F.3d 342 (5th Cir. 2008). Several students commenced an arbitration proceeding against
ITT Educational Services. Id. In his award, the arbitrator made a finding in favor of the
students. Id. at 344. In a second arbitration proceeding against ITT, the same plaintiffs
attorney sought to publicly file the arbitrator's findings in the first proceeding. Id ITT
argued that this was a violation of the express confidentiality agreement in the arbitration
clause of the contract between the parties. Id. Further, ITT argued that confidentiality is
"separable" from the contract and can therefore still be enforced even if there is a finding
of fraudulent inducement. Id. at 345. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit agreed with ITT's arguments and issued a permanent injunction preventing the
release of the arbitration documents. Id. at 344.
207 See Contship ContainerlinesLtd, 2003 WL 1948807.
208 In the United States, statutory provisions addressing non-disclosure and
confidentiality in context of arbitrations are rare. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-569.17
(e) (2011) ("An arbitrator may issue a protective order to prevent the disclosure of
privileged information, confidential information, trade secrets, and other information
protected from disclosure to the extent a court could if the controversy were the subject
of a civil action in this State."); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-7-206:
Confidentiality of communications in dispute resolution procedures. (a) Except
as provided by subsection (c) of this section, a communication relating to the
subject matter of any civil or criminal dispute made by a participant in a dispute
resolution process, whether before or after the institution of formal judicial
proceedings, is confidential and is not subject to disclosure and may not be used
as evidence against a participant in any judicial or administrative proceeding.
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that it was one of the first jurisdictions to implement a broad
statutory provision explicitly addressing the issue of privacy and
confidentiality in arbitrations. 209 Bermuda and Singapore are
relevant as two jurisdictions hosting a significant amount of

arbitrations. 2 10

(b) Any record or writing made at a dispute resolution process is confidential,
and the participants or third party or parties facilitating the process shall not be
required to testify in any proceedings related to or arising out of the matter in
dispute or be subject to process requiring disclosure or production of
information or data relating to or arising out of the matter in dispute. (c) If this
section conflicts with other legal requirements for disclosure of communications
or materials, the issue of confidentiality may be presented to the court having
jurisdiction of the proceedings to determine in camera whether the facts,
circumstances, and context of the communications or materials sought to be
disclosed warrant a protective order of the court or whether the communications
or materials are subject to disclosure.
Mo. REV.

STAT.

§ 435.014 (2011):

2. Arbitration, conciliation and mediation proceedings shall be regarded as
settlement negotiations. Any communication relating to the subject matter of
such disputes made during the resolution process by any participant, mediator,
conciliator, arbitrator or any other person present at the dispute resolution shall
be a confidential communication. No admission, representation, statement or
other confidential communication made in setting up or conducting such
proceedings not otherwise discoverable or obtainable shall be admissible as
evidence or subject to discovery.;
TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. art. §154.073 (b) (2011):
(b) Any record made at an alternative dispute resolution procedure is
confidential, and the participants or the third party facilitating the procedure
may not be required to testify in any proceedings relating to or arising out of the
matter in dispute or be subject to process requiring disclosure of confidential
information or data relating to or arising out of the matter in dispute.
See
Arbitration
Act
1996
(N.Z.),
available
at
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1996/0099/latest/DLM403277.html.
210 "[T]he total number of new cases handled by the [Singapore International
209

Arbitration Centre] increased 24%, from .

.

. 2009 to . . . 2010." Maurice Burke, et al.,

Singapore International Arbitration Centre ("SIAC') Statistics, Lexology (July 18,
2011),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspxg=ab267efl-b9b9-4834-83f6086a6cd7f09b.
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1. New Zealand
New Zealand's Arbitration Act provides that arbitration
agreements are "deemed to provide that the parties and the arbitral
tribunal must not disclose confidential information." 2 1 1
Confidential information is defined as "information that relates to
the arbitral proceedings or to an award" 212 made in those
proceedings. 2 13 However, the New Zealand Arbitration Act also
contains a number of exceptions allowing publication and
disclosure. 214 For example, the Act allows disclosure to a
professional or other advisors of any of the parties or if the
disclosure is necessary. 215 Furthermore, the Act provides that an
Arbitration Act 1996, § 14B (N.Z.).
Id. § 2.
213 - The September 3, 2007 Act was even more explicit. It provided that "an
arbitration agreement, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, is deemed to provide that
the parties shall not publish, disclose, or communicate any information relating to
arbitral proceedings under the agreement or to an award made in those proceeding."
Arbitration Act 1996 No. 99 (as of 03 Sep. 2007 (N.Z.), available at
The author
http://www.legislation.gov.nz/act/public/1996/0099/1.0/DLM405820.html.
is referencing a different Act in this footnote than that of fn#213.
214 Arbitration
Act
1996
(N.Z),
available
at
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1996/0099/1.0/DLM405704.html#DLM40570
4.
215 Id. § 14C. Section 14C states:
211

212

A party or an arbitral tribunal may disclose confidential information(a) to a professional or other adviser of any of the parties; or
(b) if both the following matters apply:
(i) the disclosure is necessary(A) to ensure that a party has a full opportunity to present the
party's case, as required under article 18 of Schedule 1; or
(B) for the establishment or protection of a party's legal rights in
relation to a third party; or
(C) for the making and prosecution of an application to a court
under this Act; and
(ii) the disclosure is no more than what is reasonably required to serve any
of the purposes referred to in subparagraph (i)(A) to (C); or
(c) if the disclosure is in accordance with an order made, or a subpoena issued,
by a court; or
(d) if both of the following matters apply:
(i) the disclosure is authorised or required by law (except this Act) or
required by a competent regulatory body (including New Zealand
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arbitral tribunal may allow disclosure of confidential information
after giving each party an "opportunity to be heard" if "at least
[one] of the parties agrees to refer that question to the arbitral
tribunal concerned." 216 Lastly, the High Court may either allow or
prohibit disclosure if the proceedings have been terminated or one
of the parties raises an appeal concerning confidentiality.2 17 In the
case of Television New Zealand Ltd. v Langley ProductionLtd.2 18
the High Court of Auckland, New Zealand also addressed the
issue of disclosure. Specifically, the court dealt with the question
of whether court proceedings regarding the appeal and
enforcement of a confidential arbitration award should be subject
to public process. 219 The court held that "as a matter of principle,
the confidentiality which the parties have adopted and embraced
with regard to their dispute resolution in arbitration cannot
automatically extend to processes for enforcement or challenge in
the High Court." 220 The court concluded that disclosure of
otherwise confidential information is appropriate if the nature of
the conflict is of "serious and public interest."2 2 1
2. Bermuda
The Bermuda International Conciliation and Arbitration Act 2 2

Exchange Limited); and
(ii) the party who, or the arbitral tribunal that, makes the disclosure
provides to the other party and the arbitral tribunal or, as the case may be,
the parties, written details of the disclosure (including an explanation of
the reasons for the disclosure); or
(e) if the disclosure is in accordance with an order made by(i) an arbitral tribunal under section 14D; or
(ii) the High Court under section 14E.
Id.
216 Id. § 14D.
217 Id. § 14E.
218 Television N.Z. Ltd. v Langley Prod. Ltd. [2000] 2 NZLR 250 (N.Z.).
219 Id.
220 Id.

38.

221 Id.

42.

Bermuda International Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1993, available at
http://www.ciarb.bm/arbitration-act-1993.
222
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seems to establish a broader protection of confidentiality by
limiting the exceptions for disclosure and establishing various
safeguards, including the requirement of party consent and in
exceptional cases prohibiting publication for up to ten years.223
The Act provides that "[tihe conciliator and the parties must keep
confidential all matters relating to the conciliation proceedings.
Confidentiality extends to the settlement agreement, except where
its disclosure is necessary for purposes of implementation and
enforcement." 2 24 The Act also empowers courts to hear cases
regarding arbitration disputes "other[] than in open court" 225 and
further restricts publication under these circumstances as follows:
(2) A court in which proceedings to which this section applies
are being heard shall, on the application of any party to the
proceedings, give directions as to what information, if any,
relating to the proceedings may be published.
(3) A court shall not give a direction under subsection (2)
permitting information to be published unless(a) all parties to the proceedings agree that such information
may be published; or
(b) the court is satisfied that the information, if published in
accordance with such directions as it may give, would not
reveal any matter, including the identity of any party to the
proceedings, that any party to the proceedings reasonably
wishes to remain confidential.
(4) Notwithstanding subsection (3), where a court gives a
judgment in respect of proceedings to which this section applies
and considers that judgment to be of major legal interest, it may
direct that reports of the judgment may be published in law
reports and professional publications but, if any party to the
proceedings reasonably wishes to conceal any matter, including
the fact that he was such a party, the court shall
(a) give directions as to the action that shall be taken to
conceal that matter in the law reports and the professional

Id. § 46.
Id. § 10.
225 Id § 45 ("Subject to the Constitution, proceedings in any court under this Act
shall on the application of any party to the proceedings be heard otherwise than in open
court.").
223

224

2012]

THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE

1091

publications; and
(b)if it considers that a report published in accordance with
directions given under paragraph (a) would be likely to
reveal that matter, direct that no law report or professional
publication shall be published until after the end of such
period, not exceeding ten years, as it considers
226
appropriate.
Despite the broad protection of confidentiality under the
Bermuda International Conciliation and Arbitration Act, the Privy
Council in Associated Electric and Gas Insurance Services Ltd. v.
European Reinsurance Company of Zurich227 rejected any
generalizations in the formulation of a duty of confidentiality in
arbitrations under Bermuda Law and advocated a case-by-case
approach.22 8 More specifically, the Privy Council recognized that
confidentiality, even under an exhaustive confidentiality
agreement, is only protected if publication "raise[s] the mischief
against which the confidentiality agreement is directed." 229 In
other words, even under Bermuda law, confidentiality may only be
protected if publication amounts to a violation or substantial
prejudice as envisioned in the confidentiality agreement between
the parties.230
3. Singapore
Singapore's Arbitration Act mirrors Bermuda's.
As in
Bermuda, proceedings relating to arbitration may also be heard
other than in open court and are considered confidential. 231 The
Arbitration Act provides that the court shall not allow information
relating to arbitration proceedings to be published unless:
Id. § 46.
Associated Elec. and Gas Ins. Services Ltd. v. European Reinsurance Co. of
Zurich, [2003] 1 All E.R. 253 (U.K.).
228 Id.
8, 11; see also John P. Gaffney, Confidentiality in International
Arbitration:A Recent Decision of the Privy Council, 18 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 18,
21-22 (2003).
229 Associated Elec. and Gas Ins. Services Ltd. v. European Reinsurance Co. of
Zurich, [2003] 1 All E.R. 253
8, 11.
230 See also Henkel, supra note 14, at 6.
231 See, e.g., Tjong Very Sumito v. Antig Investments Pte Ltd., [2010] 2 All E.R.
366 (Eng.).
226
227
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(a) [A]ll parties to the proceedings agree that such information
may be published; or
(b) the court is satisfied that the information, if published in
accordance with such directions as it may give, would not reveal
any matter, including the identity of any party to the
proceedings, that any party to the proceedings reasonably wishes
to remain confidential.23 2
Singapore's act further provides that "notwithstanding [the
above provision], where a court ... considers that judgment to be
of major legal interest, the court shall direct that reports of the
judgment may be published .in law reports and professional
publications." 2 33 It further provides that "if any party to the
proceedings reasonably wishes to conceal any matter," the court
shall direct action to "be taken to conceal the matter in the
reports."23 4 If the court determines that, even with action taken to
conceal, a report would reveal the confidential information, the
court shall not allow publication "until after the end of such
period, not exceeding [ten] years, as it considers appropriate. 2 35
Similar to the Bermuda International Conciliation and Arbitration
Act, Singapore's Arbitration Act also provides for a public interest
exception.2 36 While the statutory provisions in Singapore provide
for some protection of confidentiality as they relate to publication,
the protection remains limited by a public interest exception and is
not absolute.
D. The Lack ofAbsolute Protectionof Confidentiality
When comparing the different jurisdictional approaches on
protecting confidentiality in international commercial arbitrations,
a lack of any clear international consensus is apparent. Indeed, the

232 Singapore Arbitration Act (Chapter 10) (revised 2002) § 57, available at
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/home.w3p (search for "Singapore Arbitration Act" and
click on the first search result, "Singapore Arbitration Act (Chapter 10)") [hereinafter
Singapore Arbitration Act].
233 Id
234 Id.
235 Id
236 Id.
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emerging view among courts seems to be that disclosure of
arbitration communications and materials may be compelled.
While the English Court of Appeal in Ali Shipping v. Shipyard
Trogir2 37 held that the corollary of privacy propounds a general
implied obligation of confidentiality, the same court in City of
Moscow23 8 and Emmott v. Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd.2 39
seems to move toward a more pragmatic approach when it comes
to disclosure of arbitration materials. The same seems to be true
in France. In Nafimco v. Foster Wheeler Trading Company AG2 40
the Paris Court of Appeal increased the burden of proof for the
party claiming a violation of confidentiality.2 4 1 While English and
French courts share the fact of traditionally enforcing
confidentiality in arbitrations more strictly, the courts' approaches
towards allowing disclosure are clearly different. The English
court is focusing on a public interest exception, while the French
court simply increased the burden of proof.
In Esso v. Plowman,24 2 the High Court of Australia rejected
any implied duty of confidentiality and stressed the need of an
expressed confidentiality agreement to ensure non-disclosure.2 43
Courts in Sweden2 44 and the United States2 45 follow a similar
approach by separating the concept of privacy and confidentiality
in arbitrations. Yet, in the United States, the case law and
reasoning for granting disclosure of documents produced during
arbitrations may be the most inconsistent among all jurisdictions.
Finally, even in jurisdictions opting for a broader statutory
protection of confidentiality in arbitrations, such as New Zealand,
Bermuda, and Singapore, a limited form of disclosure of
information is permitted. In New Zealand specifically, and despite
a statute explicitly addressing the issue of privacy and

237 Ali Shipping Corp. v. Shipyard Trogir, [1998] 2 All E.R. 136 (Eng.).

238 City of Moscow v. Bankers Trust Co. [2004] All E.R. 193 (Eng.).
239 Emmott v. Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd. [2008] EWCA (Civ) 184 (Eng.).
240 Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Jan. 22, 2004, note Bureau
(Fr.).
241 Id
242 Esso Austl. Res. Ltd. v Plowman (1995), 128 ALR 391 (Austl.).
243 Id.

244 NYH Juridiskt Arkiv [NJA] [Supreme Court] 2000-10-27, 7 T1881-99 (Swed.).
245 United States v. Panhandle E. Corp., 118 F.R.D. 346 (D. Del. 1998).
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confidentiality in arbitrations,24 6 the High Court of Auckland in
Television New Zealand 47 held that confidentiality in arbitrations
cannot automatically extend to processes for enforcement of
challenges in court.24
The lack of any consensus and international convergence
stands in stark contrast to endorsing arbitration as a private form
of dispute resolution and an effective alternative to litigation.
Moreover, the resulting uncertainty clearly undermines a policy in
favor of arbitration and challenges the fundamental notion of party
autonomy in arbitrations. Even when express confidentiality
agreements are negotiated or institutional rules require that
arbitration remains confidential, it is questionable whether these
agreements hold up in courts. 49
The Work-Product Doctrine
IV.
Not unlike the assumption that the protection of the attorney
work product is necessary to prevent prejudice to the
administration of justice,2 50 this article argues that a fair balance
between confidentiality in arbitration and intersecting public
interests in disclosure may be achieved by applying the U.S.
concept of the work-product doctrine. 251' This view is based on the
246
247
248

Arbitration Act 1996, § 14 (N.Z.).
Television N.Z. Ltd. v Langley Production Ltd. [2000] 2 NZLR 250 (N.Z.).
Id. 38.

249 NOUSSIA, supra note 32, at 26-27.

250 See generally Kevin M. Clermont, Surveying Work Product, 68 CORNELL L. REV.
755 (1983); Fred C. Zacharias, Who Owns Work Product?, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 127,
129-32 (2006) ("Work-product doctrine is designed to balance the ability of lawyers to
prepare their cases free from prying eyes and the ability of parties in litigation to obtain
properly discoverable information.") This author also suggests that case law has
provided various justifications for the work-product doctrine: (1) Lawyers will be most
effective when "guaranteed a measure of professional confidentiality"; and (2) allowing
discovery of work product would "create incentives for lawyers not to produce work
product, on the one hand, and to rely on the adversary's production of work, on the
other."). Id. at 131-32. See also Special Project, The Work Product Doctrine, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 760 (1983); Elizabeth Thornburg, Rethinking Work Product, 77 VA. L.
REV. 1515, 1524-50 (1991) (discussing the theoretical justifications for work product
privilege).
251 See, e.g., Samuels v. Mitchel, 155 F.R.D. 195 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (arguing that
since arbitrations are adversarial in nature, documents prepared for use in arbitrations are
accorded work product protection); see also supra Part II.D.
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acknowledgment that confidentiality in arbitrations is an essential
factor-without it and without a level of predictability of when
disclosure can be compelled, arbitration is no longer an alternative
to, but simply another form of litigation. Parties will no longer
have any incentive to be more forthcoming with information
during arbitrations in favor of a more efficient and speedy
resolution of their disputes. At the same time and in light of the
many interests competing with confidentiality,25 2 the absolute
protection of confidentiality in arbitrations seems unachievable
and unrealistic.2 53
The approach advocated in this article favors raising the
burden of proof for the admission of evidence sought from
arbitration proceedings. It is true that this approach may not
address every challenge to confidentiality;2 54 it may, however, at a
minimum serve as a more pragmatic approach, making the law
and practice of confidentiality in international commercial
arbitrations more predictable. The qualification of confidentiality
in arbitration through the work-product doctrine may therefore
allow for a more reliable risk benefit analysis in favor of
arbitration when compared with litigation.
To be clear, this article does not argue that the attorney work
product cannot be waived during arbitration proceedings as it
relates to the preparation and production of work product in
anticipation of these proceedings.2 55 Instead, the work-product
doctrine and the propositions of Hickman v. Taylor256 may simply
be utilized as a practical and well-established standard to allow
disclosure where "production of those facts is essential" 257 for the
administration of justice. In this function, the standards used for
determining disclosure of work product in the United States may
not only provide a workable basis for greater predictability in
practice, viewed from the perspective of a comparative analysis,
252 For example, regulatory disclosure requirements for publicly held corporations
or the fact that parties to arbitration agreements increasingly seem to challenge
arbitration awards in court.
253 Esso Austl. Res. Ltd. v Plowman (1995) 128 ALR 391 (Austl).
254 NoUSSIA, supra note 32, at 9-10.
255 Id. Please note that the issue of waivers under the work-product doctrine in
arbitrations is not the focus of this article.
256 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
257 Id
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but may also serve as a starting point for an international
consensus on the issue of confidentiality in arbitrations.
A. History andBackground of the Work-ProductDoctrine
The application of the work-product doctrine as a standard in
international commercial arbitrations requires a brief discussion of
the doctrine's history and background.25 8
The work-product doctrine is always considered in context of
the attorney-client privilege. While the focus of the latter is to
encourage uninhibited attorney-client communications,2 59 the
primary purpose of the work-product doctrine is to allow for
diligent and thorough preparation by the attorney in anticipation of
litigation or arbitration.2 60 As a result, the work-product doctrine
involves much that is outside the parameters of actual attorneyclient communications. Furthermore, the protection of work
product is not absolute, as compared to attorney-client privilege,
and is limited to that created in preparation for or in anticipation of
litigation or arbitration.261 At the same time, the work-product
doctrine is considered broader in scope and reach than the
attorney-client privilege.262
While today codified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(3) 263 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(b)(2), 264 the
258 This article takes no sides in the discussion of whether the work-product doctrine
is a privilege or not. Rather, it is acknowledged that the term "doctrine" is increasingly
being replaced by the term "protection." See, e.g., Hickman, 329 U.S. at 509-10; United
States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 242-54 (1975); Railroad Salvage of Conn., Inc. v. Japan
Freight Consolidators (U.S.A.) Inc., 97 F.R.D. 37, 39-40 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
259 See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) ("The lawyer-client
privilege rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the
client's reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried
out.").
260 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511 ("[I]t is essential that a lawyer work with a certain
degree of privacy . . . Proper preparation of a client's case demands that he assemble
information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare
his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and needless interference."); see
also Thomas D. Sawaya, The Work-Product Privilegein a Nutshell, FLA. B.J., July-Aug.
1993, at 32, 34 (describing work product as "documents and tangible things ... prepared
in anticipation of litigation or for trial").

261 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
262

See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Co.), 599 F.2d 1224, 1232 (3d Cir.

1979).
263 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
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work-product doctrine is a judicially created rule established by
the United States Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor.265
The decision in Hickman arose from a wrongful death suit of a
seaman against two owners of a tugboat that sank on the Delaware
River at Philadelphia.2 66 In anticipation of litigation, the defendant
tugboat owners' attorney privately interviewed survivors and took
statements concerning the accident. Following some interviews,
the attorney also drafted memoranda of what the interviewees
said.26 7 When litigation commenced, the plaintiffs attorneys filed
interrogatories directed to the tugboat owners, asking for exact
copies of written statements made by survivors or witnesses,
including any oral statements, records, reports, or other
memoranda made concerning the accident. The tugboat owners
refused to provide some of the requested documents that they
acknowledged existed, arguing that the documents were privileged
material obtained in anticipation of, and in preparation for,
litigation.26 8
The Hickman Court recognized that the information sought by
the plaintiff was outside the scope of the attorney-client privilege
since the information was not obtained from clients.26 9 However,
the Court found that the statements were the work product of the
attorney and policy required that it be protected.27 0 The Court
recognized that if the attorney were required to turn over the
interrogatories he would essentially be turning over his strategy,
opinions, and plans.2 7' In addition, the Court reasoned that to not
protect work product would encourage attorneys to not write
things down for fear that disclosure may be compelled by
opposing counsel.2 72 The protection articulated by the court was
not absolute, a point made clear when the Court noted that "[w]e
do not mean to say that all written materials obtained or prepared
264 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(2).

265 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
266 Id. at 498.
267

Id.

268 Id. at 499.
269 Id. at 508.

270 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
271 Id. at 510.
272 Id. at 511.
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by an adversary's counsel with an eye toward litigation are
necessarily free from discovery in all cases."2 73 Specifically, the
Court held that the work product protection could be overcome
through a showing of adequate reason or necessity for obtaining
the information with the burden of proof on the party requesting
disclosure.2 74 In instances where a party shows necessity or that
denial of production would "unduly prejudice the preparation ...
or cause him undue hardship or injustice," protection of the work
product may be waived.2 75 In Hickman, the plaintiffs attorney
admitted he sought discovery of the statements merely to help him
prepare.2 76 The Court held this an insufficient reason, noting that
it was only a naked general demand without any showing of
necessity for the production of the materials.2 77
Hickman is credited with establishing two levels of protection
for work product, also commonly referred to as opinion work
product and ordinary work product.2 78 Opinion work product,
which includes an attorney's mental impressions, is given the
highest level of protection and is considered almost absolutely
shielded from disclosure because privacy is viewed as essential for
an attorney's thinking and preparation for litigation.2 79 In contrast,
ordinary work product does not enjoy the same level of protection

273

Id.

274 Id. at 512.
275 Id. at 509.

276 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 513.
277 Id
278 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 336 (8th Cir. 1977) ("[I]n
our view opinion work product enjoys a nearly absolute immunity and can be discovered
only in very rare and extraordinary circumstances."); Gamier v. Illinois Tool Works,
Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28370 (E.D.N.Y. May 4, 2006).
279 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-513; Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 40002 (1981) ("While we are not prepared at this juncture to say that such material is always
protected by the work product rule, we think a far stronger showing of necessity and
unavailability by other means . . . would be necessary to compel disclosure."); see also
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Advisory Committee's Explanatory Statement Concerning
Amendments of the Discovery Rules, 48 F.R.D. 487, 502 (1970). Note, however, that if
an attorney's mental process is put at issue in litigation, the protection of work product is
waived. See, e.g., Truck Ins. Exch. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 66 F.R.D. 129,
133-36 (E.D. Pa. 1975). See generally Protection of Opinion Work Product Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 64 VA. L. REv. 333 (1978) (discussing the strong
judicial protection accorded to opinion work product).
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and may be discovered upon a showing of need and hardship.280
Neither level of work product is absolutely protected and the
qualified work product will be disclosed if the threshold for the
burden of proof is met. In each case, the proponent or party
relying on the protection has the initial burden of proof to show
that the materials requested qualify for protection.2 8' Upon a
prima facie showing that the documents or materials are work
product, the burden of proof shifts to the party requesting to
compel disclosure.2 82
To meet this burden of proof, the
discovering party must affirmatively show both a substantial need
for the material and that there is no ability to obtain the material
by other less intrusive means without undue hardship.2 83
B. The Work-Product Doctrineas a Standardfor Disclosure
in Arbitration
For the purposes of this article, the focus is on the standard of
showing (1) a substantial need for the material produced during
arbitration proceedings, and (2) that the party requesting
disclosure lacks any ability to obtain the material by other means
without undue hardship.284
1. SubstantialNeed
Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor any of the
courts applying the work-product doctrine have conclusively
defined the parameters or minimum requirements of "substantial
need." 28 5 For example, in Hickman the Supreme Court noted that:

See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
See, e.g., Logan v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 971, 976 (7th Cir.
1996); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Shiner v. Am. Stock Exch., 28 F.R.D. 34, 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
282 See, e.g., Kent Corp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 530 F.2d 612, 623-624 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976); In re Natta, 410 F.2d 187, 193 (3d Cir), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 836 (1969); Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551,
558 (2d Cir. 1967).
283 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
284 The focus on the substantial needs test is based on the premise that a prima facie
showing of work product is not necessary in the context of the protection of
confidentiality in arbitrations.
285 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
280
281
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Where relevant and non-privileged facts remain hidden in an
attorney's file and where production of those facts is essentialto
the preparationsof one's case, discovery may properly be had.

Such written statements and documents might, under certain
circumstances, be admissible in evidence or give clues to the

existence or location of relevant facts. Or they might be useful
for purposes of impeachment or corroboration.286
Regardless, a significant body of case law is available in
which, with sufficient frequency, courts have approved
circumstances that justify the finding of substantial need. For
example, names and addresses of witnesses are discoverable.2 87
Other well-established examples are if witnesses are
unavailable,2 88 such as if a witness is deceased2 89 or, more
importantly in context of international commercial arbitrations, if
a witness is beyond the court's reach and subpoena power.2 90 At
the same time, substantial need cannot be proved because of a lack
of financial resources.2 9 1 However, witnesses who claim privilege
may be considered unavailable and statements given by them to an
adversary party in preparation for litigation may be discovered.2 92
2. Undue Hardship

The additional requirement of undue hardship refers to the
availability of alternative means in securing evidence.
In
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Boyd v. City & County of San Francisco, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27647 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2006).
288 See, e.g., DeGiacomo v. Morrison, 57 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 87 (D.N.H.
2003). For examples of more restrictive interpretations, see Marshall v. Vermont Food
Indus., Inc., 23 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (CBC) 1511 (D. Vt. 1977); Boyce v. Visi-Flash Rentals
E., Inc., 22 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (CBC) 1445 (D. Mass. 1976).
289 See, e.g., Copperweld Steel Co. v. Demag-Mannesmann-Bohler, 578 F.2d 953,
963 n.14 (3d Cir. 1978).
290 See, e.g., Hamilton v. Canal Barge Co., 395 F. Supp. 975, 976-78 (E.D. La.
1974). At the same time courts are hesitant to recognize the faulty memory of witnesses
as sufficient. See, e.g., Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS, 8322, at 6 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 26, 2001).
291 See, e.g., Gamier v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28370
(E.D.N.Y. May 4, 2006).
292 Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Hartz Mountain Indus., Inc., 553 F. Supp. 45, 50-51
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).
286
287
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Hickman, the Supreme Court addressed this issue by stating:
[P]roduction might be justified where the witnesses are no
longer available or can be reached only with difficulty. Were

production of written statements and documents to be precluded
under such circumstances the liberal ideals of the depositiondiscovery portions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
would be stripped of much of their meaning.293
Similar to the requirement of substantial need, the principle of
alternative availability applies to witness statements294 as well as
to any document prepared by the opposing party.2 Specifically,
the latter is important if disclosure might be helpful in the context
of allowing for a more efficient resolution of discovery
proceedings. 296 As with consideration of substantial need, lack of
financial means or cost alone are not sufficient to prove undue
hardship.2 97 Some courts do, however, take the relative resources
of the parties into consideration 298 and conclude there is undue
hardship if obtaining the equivalent is cost inhibitive.2 99
3. Application of the Work-ProductDoctrineas a
Standardin Arbitration

Indeed, confidentiality in international commercial arbitrations
has become an uncertain concept. While arbitration remains a
private dispute resolution mechanism and is determined by party
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511-12 (1947).
294 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Co.), 599 F.2d 1224, 1232 (3d Cir.
1979); United States v. Chatham City Corp., 72 F.R.D. 640, 643-44 (S.D. Ga. 1976).
295 See, e.g., Sprague v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 688 F.2d
862,
870; Eoppolo v. Nat'1 R.R. Passenger Corp., 108 F.R.D. 292, 295 (E.D. Pa. 1985); In re
Dayco Corp. Derivative Sec. Litig., 99 F.R.D. 616, 620 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
296 See, e.g., United States v. Amerada Hess, Corp., 619 F.2d 980, 980 (3d Cir.
1980) (noting the federal government's need to avoid time and effort in obtaining the
information elsewhere was sufficient to defeat the effects of the doctrine precluding
disclosure).
297 See, e.g., Connelly v. Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc., 96 F.R.D. 339, 343 (D. Mass.
1982); Arvey v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 53 F.R.D. 179,181 (D. Minn. 1971).
298 See, e.g., In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 616 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Jarvis, Inc.
v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 84 F.R.D. 286, 293 (D. Colo. 1979).
299 See, e.g., Allen v. Denver-Chicago Trucking Co., 32 F.R.D. 616, 618 (W.D. Mo.
1963).
293
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autonomy, it seems that courts are increasingly becoming involved
because more parties are appealing any arbitral award not in their
favor.300 In addition, public disclosure requirements may also
require parties to provide information about arbitrations otherwise
considered confidential.o'
It is in these instances that the
traditional notion of confidentiality in arbitrations is challenged
and courts seem more willing to compel disclosure of arbitration
materials than before.302
There is no doubt that arbitration will continue to be an
essential part of international commercial life and will remain the
dispute resolution mechanism of choice in international business
transactions. As long as this is the case, and as long as privacy
and confidentiality continue to be considered a fundamental
advantage of arbitration, the development of a coherent
international standard for a duty of confidentiality will continue to
be important. Yet, no such standard has emerged internationally.
Rather, many jurisdictions not only define the duty of
confidentiality differently, but also seem unwilling to develop any
coherent and generally acceptable or internationally applicable
standard for the protection of confidentiality in arbitrations.30 3 The
attitudes are shifting in even those countries, such as England and
France, which have taken traditionally broader views,
comparatively, on protecting confidentiality.
In light of these trends, the best way forward is to rely on
already established legal principles and case law to develop a
coherent international standard for confidentiality and establish a
more predictable approach business people may rely on when
choosing arbitration. The U.S. work-product doctrine is such a
principle, as it is established by case law and codified in the
Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure.3 04 As with the
duty of confidentiality in arbitration, the purpose of the workproduct doctrine in litigation is to ensure non-disclosure in the
administration of justice while at the same time allowing for

300 See Henkel, supra note 14, at 6.
301 See, e.g., NOUSsIA, supra note 32, at 22-23.
302 See, e.g., id
303 See SZE & KHOON, supra note 45, at v.

304 See FED. R. Clv. P. 26(b)(3); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2).
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disclosure when necessary.3 05
The balancing of the parties' interests in each case is an
inherent component of the work-product doctrine and may be
similarly employed in commercial arbitrations.3 06 If the need of
one party to gain access to protected documents outweighs the
interest of the other party in protecting its work product from
disclosure, the documents will be disclosed.30' The sufficient
showing of need is based on the presence of two concurrent
factors: Substantial need and the inability to obtain the material
without undue hardship.30 s In making their decisions, the courts
further determine the availability of alternative sources for the
information sought, the need to protect the expectation that
confidentiality would be preserved, and the relative resources of
the parties involved.30 9
The Privy Council in Aegis3 '0 has recognized a balancing
approach similar to that under the work-product doctrine by noting
that confidentiality is only protected if disclosures "raise the
mischief against which. . . confidentiality . ..

is directed."3 11

Specifically, the expectation of confidentiality in international
commercial arbitrations may be balanced by requiring any party
seeking disclosure of communications and documents from
arbitrations to prove (1) a substantial need for the materials, and
(2) the inability to obtain the substantial equivalent of the
information from the materials without undue hardship.
Applying the work-product doctrine may also avoid the
shortcomings of broad exceptions to the duty of confidentiality,
such as those established by the English Court of Appeal in Ali
See discussion supra Part IV. 1.
306 See, e.g., In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 733 F.2d 1367, 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
("[T]he work product privilege is a broader protection, designed to balance the needs of
the adversary system to promote an attorney's preparation in representing a client against
society's general interest in revealing all true and material facts relevant to the resolution
of a dispute.").
305

307 See id
308 See id.

309 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Nov. 8, 1979, 622 F.2d 933, 935 (6th
Cir. 1980).
310 Associated Elec. and Gas Ins. Services Ltd. v. European Reinsurance Co. of
Zurich [2003] 1 All E.R. 253 (Eng.).
311 Id.T8.
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Shipping.3 12 The requirement of showing substantial need and
undue hardship may provide a pragmatic standard to fill the terms
of "legitimate [interest] of an arbitrating party""' or "public
interest"314 with meaning and prevent the unlimited extension of
exceptions at the same time. To be sure, it seems that the inability
to define the exceptions to confidentiality in general terms is one

of the reasons why the English Court of Appeal is now moving
toward a more pragmatic approach based on a spectrum."' In Ali
Shipping, the court refused to review exceptions of confidentiality
on a case-by-case basis. Yet, in City of Moscow,"' the court
seemed to have changed its attitude towards this more pragmatic
-317
view.
In Nafimco v. Foster Wheeler Trading Company AG... the
Paris Court of Appeal increased the burden of proof required and
held that any party claiming a breach of confidentiality has the
burden of proving that a duty of confidentiality actually existed.3 19
The Paris Court of Appeal, however, does not seem to define the
parameters of the burden of proof it requires. The work-product
doctrine may fill this void under French law by requiring the proof
of a substantial need and undue hardship.
The work-product doctrine may further establish a narrower
and more predictable standard in jurisdictions that follow the
concept of an express duty of confidentiality and traditionally
focus on the importance of parties executing an express
confidentiality agreement. Even if arbitrating parties enter into an
explicit confidentiality agreement, courts in Australia,320
Sweden, 32 1 or the United States 322 may compel disclosure. Just as
Ali Shipping Corp. v. Shipyard Trogir, [1998] 2 All E.R. 136 (Eng.).
313 Id.
314 Id
315 See, e.g., Henkel, supra note 14, at 15-19.
316 Dep't of Econ. Policy and Dev. of the City of Moscow & Another v. Bankers
Trust Co. and Another, [2004] All E.R. 193 (Eng.).
317 See, e.g., Henkel, supra note 14, at 15-19.
318 Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Jan. 22, 2004, 3 Revue de
l'Arbitrage (Fr.).
319 Id
320 See Esso Austl. Res. Ltd v Plowman, (1995) 128 ALR 391 (Austl.).
321 See, e.g., A.I. Trade Award Upheld Swedish Supreme Court Affirms Court of
Appeal, 15 MEALEY'S INT'L. ARB. REP. (11), 3 (Nov. 2000).
312
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under English and French law, however, courts do not apply any
clear or uniform standards under which circumstances this should
be permitted. Courts in Australia, Sweden or the United States
may rely on the public interest to limit the protection of
confidentiality, while at the same time failing to define a uniform
starting point or limit of this exception. The same is true in
countries with statutory provisions that protect confidentiality.3 23
Courts in these jurisdictions may also compel disclosure if it is
found to be in the public interest.324 The work-product doctrine
may be utilized in this context as a means toward a judicially
enforceable duty of confidentiality in international commercial
arbitrations.
V.
Conclusion
The law and practice of confidentiality in international
commercial arbitration has become unpredictable due to a lack of
any clear international consensus on how to best protect
confidentiality. The duty of confidentiality is not absolute in any
international jurisdiction. Business people may no longer assume
that the private character of arbitrations automatically ensures
confidentiality. Even if parties have agreed on explicit terms of a
confidentiality agreement, courts are increasingly endorsing the
view that disclosure may be compelled regardless of the expressed
intent of the parties. This in turn not only challenges the
fundamental notion of party autonomy in arbitrations, it also
ultimately undermines any policy in favor of arbitration.
Maintaining the importance of arbitration as a viable alternative to
litigation may therefore depend on agreeing on an international
consensus on confidentiality and its limits in commercial
arbitration. No international jurisdiction seems to challenge the
view that the protection of confidentiality should be limited. At
the same time there has been no suggestion on how to create a
uniform standard on an international level. This article argues that
applying the U.S. work-product doctrine may offer a starting point

See, e.g., Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household International, Inc., 59
Fed. R. Serv.3d 473 (D. Colo. 2004).
323 See, e.g., Television N.Z. Ltd. v Langley Production Ltd. [2000] 2 NZLR 250
(N.Z.); Singapore Arbitration Act, supra note 232, at ch. 10 § 57.
324 See, e.g., Television N.Z., 2 NZLR at 250.
322
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for this discussion. The balancing approach of the work-product
doctrine as well as the standard of substantial need and undue
hardship is a well-established rule in U.S. law and may aid in
defining uniform limits for otherwise undefined or very broadly
defined exceptions to confidentiality in international commercial
arbitrations.

